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Lawyers have traditionally viewed law as a closed system, and doctrinal research has 
been the research methodology used most widely in the profession. This reflects 
traditional concepts of legal reasoning. There is a wealth of reliable and valid social 
science data available to lawyers and judges. Judges in fact often refer to general facts 
about the world, society, institutions and human behaviour (‘empirical facts’). Legal 
education needs to prepare our students for this broader legal context. This paper 
examines how ‘empirical facts’ are used in Australian and other common law courts. 
Specifically, the paper argues that there is a need for enhanced training in non-doctrinal 
research methodologies across the law school curriculum. This should encompass a broad 
introduction to social science methods, with more attention being paid to a cross-section 
of methodologies such as content analysis, comparative law and surveys that are best 








There is a vast array of valid social science research available to the modern lawyer. 
Research of current Australian, United States and United Kingdom judicial decisions 
demonstrates judges do refer to empirical facts and sometimes refer to social science 
research as part of judicial reasoning.1 In this article we define empirical facts as ‘general 
facts about the world, society, institutions and human behaviour’. Traditionally lawyers 
have been trained within a ‘doctrinal’ research methodology framework. There are 
existing rules of evidence in all jurisdictions allowing for a formal use of empirical data 
within the doctrinal framework.2 However these existing rules of evidence do not appear 
to adequately cater for the wide variety of ways in which empirical facts are utilised in 
judicial decisions.3 Increasingly, empirical fact assumptions and sometimes social science 
material is being subsumed within judgments. The way this material finds its way into 
judges’ decisions appears to primarily rest upon judicial discretion.4 Social science 
material relevant to empirical fact assumptions is not always (or even often) adequately 
acknowledged by judges.5 The recognition of the judicial use of empirical facts as part of 
judicial reasoning raises the need for new approaches to legal research and legal research 
training based in the social sciences. It suggests that lawyers need better training in non-
                                                 
1 See for example Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 199 ALR 131 (wrongful birth); Woods v Multi-Sport 
Holdings (2002) 208 CLR 460 (extra record social scientific material); St Helens Borough Council v 
Derbyshire and others [2007] 3 All ER 81 (working lives of women); Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 All ER 929 
(Cohabitation). See also K. Burns, “Its Just not Cricket: The High Court, Sport and Legislative Facts” 
(2002) 10 Torts Law Journal 234; K. Burns, “The Way the World is: Social Facts in High Court 
Negligence Cases” (2004) 12 Torts Law Journal 215; and G. Mullane, “Evidence of Social Science 
Research: Law, Practice, and Options in the Family Court of Australia” (1998) 72 Australian Law Journal 
434. 
2 This includes through the doctrine of judicial notice and through relevant provisions of evidence 
legislation. See Burns (2004), ibid 221-4; Mullane, ibid 441-52. 
3 Burns (2004), ibid 224. There have been suggestions that the rules of evidence in relation to the 
admission of empirical facts needs to be reviewed. See discussion at 221-4. The way in which Australian 
courts deal with empirical facts was discussed by both the 2000 Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) Report Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, Report No 89, 1999, 
recommendations 108-9 and the Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, Report 102, 
2005, 17.3-17.27 in relation to judicial notice and the operation of s 144 of the Evidence Acts. The 
Commission recommended against any change to the legislation in relation to judicial notice to reflect the 
use of ‘social facts’ [17.27]. There have been no changes either to Australian evidence law or practice in 
recent years that respond to the judicial use of empirical facts, or attempts to better equip judges to make 
reliable findings about empirical facts.  
4 Ibid. 
 3
doctrinal methodologies. In this article we will consider how judges use empirical facts in 
their judicial decisions and the implications of this for traditional concepts of legal 
research and legal research training. In Part I of the article we will define the concept of 
‘empirical facts’ and briefly discuss how judges utilise empirical facts in their judgments. 
In Part II we will discuss the implications of this judicial use of empirical facts for 
traditional models of legal research. In Part III we will discuss how legal research 
training in the future should respond to the use of empirical facts in judicial decision-
making.  This article will argue that traditional models of legal research, and traditional 
doctrinal approaches to legal research training, fail to respond to the use of empirical 
facts by judges. New approaches must be considered.  
 
I  DEFINING EMPIRICAL FACTS AND JUDICIAL USE OF EMPIRICAL 
FACTS 
 
Various commentators have attempted to categorise the facts judges use in their judicial 
reasoning. In 1942, Kenneth Culp Davis argued that there were two types of facts used by 
judges – ‘legislative facts’ and ‘adjudicative facts’.6 Adjudicative facts are ‘case-specific 
facts’, including instances where social science research is submitted as evidence 
regarding a matter of specific contention between the parties.7 Adjudicative facts are not 
included within the definition of empirical facts in this article. Adjudicative facts are facts 
found by judges as part of litigation. They tend to be limited to the litigants in the specific 
dispute and are normally subject to the usual rules of evidence.  
 
Where a ‘court or an agency develops law or policy it is acting legislatively’ and Kenneth 
Davis called the use of facts in this context ‘legislative facts’.8 Legislative facts aim to 
define legal contexts and relationships in society as a whole.9 This category is similar to 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Burns (2004), ibid 229. 
6  K. C. Davis, “An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative process” (1942) 55 Harvard 
Law Review 364. See also K. C. Davis, “Judicial Notice” (1955) 55 Columbia Law Review 945. 
7 A. Smith, Law, Social Science and the Criminal Courts (Durham, Carolina Academic Press 2004), 24. 
8 Davis (1955), supra n. 6, 952. 
9 L. Etlinger, “Social science research in domestic violence law: A proposal to focus on evidentiary use” 
(1995) Albany Law Review 1259, 1263, from C. Bleil, “Evidence of Syndromes” (1990) 32 South Texas 
Law Review 37. This categorisation is accepted in the Federal Rules of Evidence in the United States. 
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what John Monahan and Laurens Walker have called the use of social science as ‘social 
authority’.10 Monahan and Walker have also noted that courts may use social science to 
‘construct a frame of reference or background context for deciding a factual issue crucial 
to the resolution of a specific case’.11 They refer to this as ‘social framework’.12 For 
example, when a judge draws on material in relation to ‘battered wives syndrome’ to 
allow an interpretation of the adjudicative facts regarding a particular spouse in a case, 
the judge is using that material as social framework.13  
 
Justice Graham Mullane, in a study of 1990 Australian Family Court cases, discussed the 
use of assumptions by judges ‘concerning human behaviour’, which he called ‘social 
facts’.14 He indicated the basis for ‘social facts’ may be ‘revealed’ by social scientific 
disciplines such as ‘history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science and 
related fields’.15 Kylie Burns has defined the term ‘social facts’ more widely as including 
the ‘continuum of assumptions judges make about society, the world and human 
behaviour’ in their reasoning.16 It is apparent from both Burns’ and Mullane’s study that 
judges may sometimes refer to empirical evidence in support of these kinds of 
assumptions, but far more commonly there is no evidence provided or referred to in the 
judgment.17  
 
We define ‘empirical facts’ in this article as assertions of facts about society, the world 
and human behaviour which are hypothetically able to be proved by social science or 
empirical methodologies.18 This category includes Davis’ legislative facts, Burns’ and 
                                                 
10 J. Monahan & L. Walker, “Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in 
Law” (1986) 134 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477. 
11 Supra n. 7; see also L. Walker & J. Monahan, “Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in 
Law” (1987) 73 Virginia Law Review 559. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See for example the evidence presented on battered wife’s syndrome in R v Lavallee [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.   
14 Mullane, supra n. 1. 
15 Ibid 450. 
16 Burns (2004), supra n. 1, 219. 
17 Burns (2004), supra n. 1; Mullane supra n. 1. 
18 We take social sciences to include such disciplines as political science, sociology, psychology, history, 
economics, statistics, anthropology and behavioural science.  For a discussion of the impact of social 
science on legal research in the legal academy see C Madden, “Legal Research and the Social Sciences” 
(2006) Law Quarterly Review 632. We take empirical methodologies to include social science research 
methods such as surveys, interviews, content analysis, and case studies. For a discussion of these methods 
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Mullane’s social facts and Monahan and Walker’s social authority and social 
framework.19 Similar to these categories, empirical facts are not statements of legal 
principle or adjudicative facts. They are assertions used as part of the judicial reasoning 
process. They may be used in a wide variety of ways by judges in their reasoning. They 
may be used to set background context, in a rhetorical way to support arguments of legal 
principle, to assist in the determination or interpretation of adjudicative facts, or as 
arguments of policy or consequence used in the development of law.20 Statements of 
empirical fact sometimes merge into statement of legal or social values, for example 
statements that refer to enduring community values such as the value of human life. 
 
As Paddy Hillyard has pointed out, ‘Parliament, government, businesses and NGOs’ all 
appreciate the importance of ‘evidence-based research to inform the development of law, 
the administration of justice, and the practice of law’.21 It is therefore not surprising that a 
close textual examination of a variety of court judgments demonstrates that judges use 
empirical facts when they encounter gaps in knowledge. Justice Mullane, in a study of 
302 final custody judgments from the Family Court of Australia in 1992, found 82 social 
fact statements.22 Sixty-five percent of these had no source stated or the source was stated 
as undefined research.23 A relatively high proportion of social fact statements (32%) had 
expert evidence stated as a source, however this most likely reflects the nature of the 
Family Court which has frequent recourse to expert witnesses on issues such as the best 
interests of children.24  Only 1% of social fact statements were found to be supported by 
research nominated and specified by the judge.25 
 
 The Burns study considered 11 negligence cases handed by the High Court of Australia 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the legal context see T.Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (2nd ed, Sydney, Lawbook Co., 
2006), Chapter 5. 
19 It may however be narrower than Burns’ definition which also includes matters that could not be 
technically proven empirically. 
20 Burns (2004), supra n. 1, 219-21. 
21 P. Hillyard, “Law’s Empire: Socio-Legal Empirical Research in the Twenty-first Century” (2007) 34(2) 
Journal of Law and Society 266, 268. 
22 Mullane, supra n. 1, 453, Schedule 2. 




in 2003.26 Burns found 325 statements of social facts in the relevant judgments.27 The 
social fact statements made by judges of the High Court of Australia were made in a wide 
range of ways. They were used to interpret adjudicative facts, as general context 
statements, as statements of consequence of liability and as mixed statements of social 
fact and value (for example the social value of human life).28 The vast majority of social 
fact statements made by judges were unsourced29 and only three social fact statements 
were sourced to a form of social science or empirical evidence.30 The social fact 
statements made in the cases were made by both judges considered ‘activist’ in judicial 
approach and judges considered ‘conservative’ in judicial approach. One of the most 
prolific ‘social fact’ cases analysed in the study, Cattanach v Melchior31 (the leading 
Australian case on wrongful birth) featured a multitude of social fact statements made by 
Heydon J who is considered to be more conservative in judicial approach.32  Many of 
these social fact statements were highly contentious, for example the psychological 
effects of litigation on children.33 No social science evidence was referred to by Heydon J 
in support of these social fact statements.34 Similarly, Bradley Selway, in a 2001 study, 
identified many examples of the use of history and other facts in the judicial reasoning 
within High Court of Australia judgments.35 He also came to the conclusion that ‘There 
are scientific, cultural, social and economic facts (to say nothing of the broad category of 
experience encompassed in the phrase ‘common sense’) that are used as a matter of 
course in legal argument and in legal reasoning and that are not strictly proved in 
evidence’.36 The use of this form of empirical fact material in judgments in the United 
States has also been well documented.37 Many empirical fact statements are made by 
                                                 
26 Burns (2004), supra n. 1. 
27 Ibid 225. 
28 Ibid 226-9. 
29 Ibid  229. Only 81 statements were referenced in any way at all. 
30 Ibid. 
31 (2003) 215 CLR 1. 
32 Burns (2004), supra n. 1, 231-6. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 B. Selway, “The Use of History and Other Facts in the Reasoning of the High Court of Australia” (2001) 
20(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 129. 
36 Ibid 156. 
37 For example see P. C. Davis, “‘There is a Book Out There’ An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of 
Legislative Facts” (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 1539. See also the discussion of the use of content 
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judges implicitly and without any empirical support. However, judges do sometimes 
explicitly reference empirical or social science material in their judgments. It is less 
common in the United Kingdom and Australia nevertheless there are examples of the use 
of social science material in judgments.38 
 
II IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL RESEARCH SCHOLARSHIP 
 
What are the implications for legal research scholarship of this expanding body of social 
science literature? It is important that these methodologies and information are integrated 
into legal discourse. Doctrinal research has been the dominant influence in legal 
scholarship during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.39 However, limiting legal 
scholarship and research training to traditional doctrinal analysis has obvious limitations 
when lawyers (and judges) are being confronted with the need for and the relevance of 
results of  empirical and interdisciplinary scholarship. This section examines the 
parameters of traditional legal research in Australia. It discusses the separate strand of 
socio-legal research that has developed in particular in the US, Canada and the United 
Kingdom, and speculates briefly as to why there have not been such extensive moves 
towards these methodologies in Australia. 
 
A Historical View 
 
Traditionally law has been viewed as a closed system. What do we mean by this? In terms of 
legal research scholarship and research methodologies it has meant that lawyers have looked at 
                                                                                                                                                 
analysis to study judicial use of social science material in the United States M A Hall and R F Wright 
“Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions” (2008) 96 California Law Review  63. 
38 For example in the Australian High Court negligence case of Woods v Multi Sport Holdings Justice 
McHugh referred to social science evidence on the rate of accidents and eye injuries during his discussion 
of whether an indoor cricket centre should be responsible for an eye injury to a player ((2002) 208 CLR 
460 at [62]). In the House of Lords in St Helens Borough Council v. Derbyshire and others[2007] 3 All ER 
81,] (a case concerning equal pay and sex discrimination claims), Baroness Hale of Richmond discussed 
the working lives of women and in particular the evidence of injustice women had historically suffered in 
the workplace in the United Kingdom ([30]-[31).  This included both general statements of empirical facts 
and the use of statistical material in relation to gender pay gaps. In Stack v. Dowden [2007] 2 All ER 929(a 
case concerning property interests of co-habiting couples) Baroness Hale of Richmond extensively 
discussed the nature of cohabitation between couples in the United Kingdom (at [45]). Again this included 
general empirical fact statements about the nature of cohabitation before and instead of marriage. The 
statements also draw on a range of social science material including published research papers, law 
commission reports, and research reports on British social attitudes. 
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the law in isolation. Legal researchers have adopted an ‘internal approach’ and have analysed 
the legal rules and principles ‘taking the perspective of an insider in the system’.40 The sources 
of law have been the primary materials, the doctrine of the law – the case law and legislation. 
The research carried out has largely been confined to an analysis of legal doctrine. Thus 
doctrinal research is the established traditional territory of the lawyer-researcher. As a result, 
where legal research has been taught in the law schools the methodology taught has been 
doctrinal research. In some cases doctrinal legal research has not even been taught explicitly. 
Law schools have relied on the ‘osmosis effect’ for research training. We can define doctrinal 
research as - 
 
‘Research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular 
legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, 
perhaps, predicts future developments.’41 
 
What is evident from this study on the use of empirical facts in the courts is that lawyers need 
to look at the law from a much broader angle than has been done previously. This is a quite 
concrete example of how the law does not work within a vacuum. Therefore, as researchers, 
lawyers need to be totally cognisant of the parameters of empirically-based knowledge and 
research methodologies.  
 
More extensive training needs to be offered in Fundamental Research. This is ‘Research 
designed to secure a deeper understanding of law as a social phenomenon, including 
research on the historical, philosophical, linguistic, economic, social or political 
implications of law’.42 This very important category was highlighted in the Canadian 
Arthurs Report on legal research in 198343 but totally overlooked by the Australian 
Pearce Committee review in 1987,44 and it is this category which is becoming more 
                                                 
40 C.McCrudden, supra n. 18 at 633. 
41 D. Pearce, E. Campbell & D. Harding, “Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, A Summary” (1987), 6. 
42 Information Division of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Law and 
Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and the Humanities Research Council of Canada by the 
Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (1983), 66. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Supra n. 41. 
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prevalent in current research agendas. Fundamental research, which can include empirical 
and social science models, needs to be part of the graduating lawyers’ research skills and 
attributes. Fundamental research encourages an interdisciplinary perspective and use of 
methodologies borrowed from the social sciences to study the law in operation. It 
expands legal research from a purely doctrinal isolated ‘box’ and encourages a broader 
view of the way law is actually working in society.  
 
B The History of the Use of Empirical Methodologies in Law 
 
There is a growing empirical law movement in the United States at present. Empirical 
work and the interface of law and social science is a continuing tradition in the United 
States, dating back to the Realist movement in the 1930s and 1940s.45 That movement 
was keen to highlight the differences between ‘law on the books’ and ‘law in action’.46 
These issues were taken up by the law and society movements in the 1960s. As Tracey 
George has noted, the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) has had a section 
devoted to ‘social science technique’ since 1982, when it established the Law and the 
Social Sciences Section.47 The terms of reference for this interest group were ‘to promote 
communication among those persons who are interested in using the empirical techniques 
of the social sciences to study legal problems and institutions’.48 The AALS is cognizant 
of the current interest in Empirical Legal Scholarship (ELS). An example of this focus is 
AALS President N. William Hines’ choice of ‘Empirical scholarship: what should we 
study and how should we study it?’ as the theme for the 2006 AALS annual meeting.  
 
                                                 
45 M. Davies Asking the Law Question (Rozelle NSW, Lawbook Co, 1994), 120-128.  
46 P. Ewick, R. Kagan & A. Sarat (eds) Social Science, Social Policy, and the Law (New York, Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1999), 2. 
47 T. E. George, “An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools” (2006) 81 
Indiana Law Journal 141 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=775864> at 30 September 
2008. 
48 Ibid; T. E. George, “An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools,” 
Vanderbilt University Law School, Working Paper 05-20, 8 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=775864> at 30 September 2008. 
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Robert Ellickson, in a recent citation analysis of trends in US legal scholarship, found 
that ‘number crunching’ is also rising in law journals.49 Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein 
are calling this a new intellectual movement: 
 ‘We are in the midst of a flowering of “large-scale quantitative studies of facts 
and outcome,” with numerous published results. The relevant studies have 
produced a New Legal Realism movement - an effort to understand the sources of 
judicial decisions on the basis of testable hypotheses and large data sets.’50  
They note the alignment of this work with that of the political scientists.51 They also note 
the possible reasons for this groundswell being ‘the decline in the costs of computing and 
data-gathering, the increasing presence on law faculties of people with post-graduate 
training in both law and social sciences, and the prevailing sense in certain 
interdisciplinary fields, particularly economic analysis of law, that empirical work rather 
than abstract theory now presents the greatest opportunities for contributions’.52 The New 
Realists are aware that the movement has ‘jurisprudential implications’, but this is 
certainly not the focus of their work.53 Much of their research focuses on links between 
judicial behaviour, gender, and politics.54  
 
The New Legal Realism project jointly sponsored by the Institute for Legal Studies and 
the American Bar Foundation, is an example of the new movement. It is a network of 
scholars who are developing an interdisciplinary paradigm for empirical research on law. 
This paradigm is said to combine ‘sophisticated consideration of legal issues, empirical 
research and social policy -- much as did the old legal realists, but with the benefit of 
                                                 
49 R. Ellickson, “Trends in Legal Scholarship” (2000) 29(51) The Journal of Legal Studies 517, 528-30 
<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/468084> at 30 September 2008. See also Gregory C 
Sisk "The quantitative moment and the qualitative opportunity:Legal studies of judicial decision-making 
(2008) 93 Cornell Law Review  873; and Edward K. Cheng, “Will the Quants rule the (Legal) World 
(2009) 107 Michigan Law Review  967. 
50 T. J. Miles & C. R. Sunstein, “The New Legal Realism” University of Chicago Law Review, 
forthcoming, available at Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070283> at 30 
September 2008. 
51 Ibid 3. 
52 Ibid 13; see also P. Schuck, “Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research? ” (1989) 39 
Journal of Legal Education 323, 331-33. 
53 Miles & Sunstein, Ibid 11. 
54 Ibid 3. 
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several generations of new thinking in all of these areas’.55 The New Legal Realism is 
‘Seeking to develop a rigorous, genuinely interdisciplinary approach to the empirical 
study of law.’56  The website sets out the aims of the group: 
‘We hope to encourage a conversation about the use of social science to inform 
legal practices, in order to build a more rigorous and informed framework for the 
interdisciplinary study of law.’57 
 
This is a dynamic movement in US legal scholarship. Apart from the established forums 
provided by the Association of Law and Society, recent examples include the recently 
formed Society for Empirical Legal Studies (SELS), and the Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies (JELS) established in 2004.58 The first Annual Conference on Empirical Legal 
Studies (CELS) was held at the University of Texas in 2006, and there is a popular ELS 
blog.59 Cornell University Faculty of Law hosted the 3rd CELS in 2008 and New York 
University in 2007.  More recently, Elizabeth Chambliss reports on the establishment of 
Empirical Research Centres in several American law schools including the Center for 
Empirical Research in Law at Washington University, the Empirical Research Group at 
the University of California, and the Empirical Legal Colloquium Series at Northwestern 
University School of Law.60 Law schools have been ranked on this basis.61 
 
ELS's contributing disciplines include psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology, 
political science as well as law. The methodologies appear to be ‘more quantitative than 
qualitative and more contemporary than historical’.62 Certainly many of the scholars 
                                                 
55 University of Wisconsin Law School <http://law.wisc.edu/ils/newlegal.htm> at 30 September 2008.  
56 New Legal Realism <http://www.newlegalrealism.org/> at 30 September 2008. 
57 New Legal Realism: About <http://newlegalrealism.org/about> at 30 September 2008. 
58 US Law and Society Association <http://www.lawandsociety.org/> at 30 September 2008; Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies <http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/society.asp?ref=1740-1453> at 30 
September 2008. 
59 ELS Blog <http://www.elsblog.org/> at 30 September 2008. 
60 E. Chambliss, “When do Thoughts persuade? Some thoughts on the Market for ‘Empirical Legal 
Studies’” <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263369> at 30 September 2008. 
61 Supra n. 47. 
62 M. Suchman, “Empirical Legal Studies: Sociology of Law, or Something ELS Entirely?” Summer 2006 
(13)1 Amici: Newsletter of the Sociology of Law Section of the American Sociological Association 1 
<http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/soc_anthro/soclaw/textfiles/AMICI_summer06.pdf> at 30 
September 2008. 
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seem more intent on examining the US legal process rather than in addressing the issue of 
infusion of the results of empirical work into the legal process itself, that is, into the 
determination of the law. They examine, for example, the political biases of the judges, 
how the gender of the judges and the make-up of the bench can affect case outcomes, 
legal process statistics, and factors affecting legal outcomes – focusing on US 
jurisdictions primarily.63  
 
In Canada, Roderick Macdonald writing in 2003 states that ‘Published research by law 
teachers is still overwhelmingly doctrinal and oriented to the professional tasks of 
planning, dispute avoidance and dispute resolution’.64 However, Shanahan’s 2006 survey 
of legal academics demonstrates that legal academic researchers are using non-doctrinal 
methodologies to some extent. They do want to use empirical methodologies rather than 
undertaking purely doctrinal research methodologies. 65   Shanahan comments that: 
 
It is apparent from both the survey data and interview findings that 
interdisciplinary research has increased in the past 20 years, as have the range of 
subject areas, and the geographic, ideological and theoretical orientation of legal 
research. However it appears as if law professors are still methodologically 
limited in their range of approaches, and especially in their use of empirical 
research. ….. The findings from the interviews in this study suggest that doctrinal 
analysis is decreasing, disfavoured and even denigrated in the academy.66 
 
This issue is being discussed in the United Kingdom. Anthony Bradney stated in 1998: 
                                                 
63 J. H. Blume, T. Eisenberg, S. L. Johnson & V. P. Hans, “The Death Penalty in Delaware: An Empirical 
Study” Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-025, 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal 
Studies Papers <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_ 
id =1032734> at 30 September 2008; M. M. Feeley & H. Aviram, “Where Have All the Women Gone? 
The Decline of Women in the Criminal Justice Process” 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal 
Studies Papers <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse& 
journal_id=1032734> at 30 September 2008. 
64 R.Macdonald ‘Still “Law” and Still “Learning”?’ (2003) 18 (1) Canadian Journal of Law and Society 5, 
10; And see generally T.Hwong ‘Does Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Decision Making Contribute to 
Legal Knowledge?’ Law Forum, University of Manitoba, 2 June 2004. 
65 T. Shanahan ‘Legal Scholarship in Ontario's English-Speaking Common Law Schools’ (2006) 21 (2) 
Canadian Journal of Law and Society 25. 
66 Ibid 36. 
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The academic doctrinal project which has dominated United Kingdom university 
law schools for most of their history … is now entering its final death throes’.67 
Bradney does acknowledge there are contrary views.68 However, he believes there has 
been an ‘abandonment of the doctrinal project’ because it ‘is incapable of producing 
satisfactory answers to any intellectually compelling questions, or, as frequently, infusing 
doctrinal method with other techniques’.69 Bradney suggests this is ‘a new stage in an 
evolutionary process’.70 The 2006 Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal Research 
concluded that there was an unmet need for empirical research stemming from a lack of 
capacity to undertake this type of research in the research institutes.71 This report 
demonstrates a movement within the UK to further the connection between law and 
social science methodologies, and so deepen expertise in the legal academy. The Report 
notes that ‘Empirical legal research is increasingly important to and valued by policy 
makers, law reformers, the judiciary, academics and practitioners’ but also that there is 
‘clear evidence of a developing crisis in the capacity of UK universities to undertake 
empirical legal research’.72 The study cited the following factors as all being partly to 
blame for the predicament: 
 
 ‘The traditions and culture of legal scholarship and its relative insularity from 
social science. 
 The impact of professional practice training requirements on the undergraduate 
law curriculum 
 The absence of engagement with law - either legal issues or law as an empirical 
site - in social science disciplines like political science or sociology or 
psychology, other than in criminology. 
                                                 
67 A. Bradney, “Law as a Parasitic Discipline” (1998) 25(1) Journal of Law and Society 71. 
68 See G. Jones, “Traditional Legal Scholarship: A Personal View in ‘What are Law Schools For?’” ed P. 
Birks (1996) 14. 
69 Ibid 73. 
70 Ibid 72. 
71 Hillyard, Supra n. 21, 269. 
72 H. Genn, M. Partington & S. Wheeler, Law in the Real World: Improving our Understanding of How 
Law Works: The Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal Research, November 2006, 39 <http://www.ucl.ac. 
uk/laws /socio-legal/empirical/> at 30 September 2008. 
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 The breadth and variety and relative lack of clear definition in ‘civil law’ 
spanning as it does family law, administrative law, mental health law, and civil 
and commercial law. 
 The absence of sustained and predictable funding streams for empirical work in 
non-criminal law. 
 The absence of research training tailored to the needs of new recruits who wish to 
do empirical legal research, coming as they do, from disparate routes, which 
needs to be recognised. 
 The fact that in most institutions there is no ‘critical mass’ of empirical legal 
researchers who can provide training for postgraduates and provide 
encouragement and support to colleagues. 
 University structures and other reward structures that may inhibit cross-
disciplinary collaboration.73  
 
These points are equally applicable in Australia. The report examined strategies to 
address the situation including changes to the curriculum and incentives and training for 
legal researchers.74 However, Paddy Hillyard has suggested that even with such 
enthusiastic solutions, ‘the development of a critical mass of socio-legal research is likely 
to be difficult to achieve’.75 Hillyard’s opinion is based on two reasons – the ‘entrenched’ 
culture of existing doctrinal legal scholarship, and the implications of the ‘changing 
political economy of higher education’76 in the UK which include managerialism and are 
antithetical to risk taking or ‘critical socio-legal scholarship’ .77 
 
The empirical studies movement is not as strong in Australia. The Australasian Law 
Teachers Association (ALTA) has no empirical legal studies interest group. There is a 
Law and Social Justice Interest Group and a Legal Research Communications Group 
which has a focus on research methodologies including the promotion of empirical 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid 5. 
75 Supra n. 21, 274. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid 279. 
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approaches.78 However, the Law and Society Association of Australia and New Zealand 
which aims ‘to promote and foster scholarship broadly focusing on the interactions and 
intersections between law and society’ has a growing profile and maintains links with 
national and international socio-legal associations.79  
 
It is timely to consider how we as legal educators might inculcate these skills in our 
graduates – and especially in our academic track higher degree research students. At 
present, greater use is being made by legal scholars of empirical methods. Academics 
need to ensure that the methods they are using results in ‘good’ empirical research.80 
They need to ensure that the standards are high. There is an onus on legal academics to 
lead by example – to demonstrate academic leadership by joining interdisciplinary groups 
and demonstrating an openness to learning and working with empirical methodologies. 
 
C A Review of Legal Research Methodologies 
 
Over the past decade there has been recognition that the law cannot be confined to a 
‘black letter’ box. There has also been a move towards some relatively ‘safe’ research 
methods extensions including research into the philosophy underlying legal rules 
(theoretical research), research into the reform of legal rules (law reform research), and 
research into the policy behind legal rules (policy research). These extended research 
methods along with some more fashionable extensions such as comparative research, the 
                                                 
78 ALTA Interest Group Notice Board <http://www.alta.edu.au/noticeboard.html> at 30 September 2008. 
79 The Law and Society Organisation of Australia and New Zealand Inc <http://www.lsaanz.org/aboutus. 
html> at 30 September 2008. See also The Centre for Media and Communication Law, University of 
Melbourne <http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/cmcl/> at 30 September 2008; The Legal Intersections 
Research Centre, University of Wollongong <http://www.uow.edu.au/ law/LIRC/> at 30 September 2008; 
The Socio-Legal Research Centre, Griffith University <http://www. griffith.edu.au/centre/slrc/> at 30 
September 2008; Centre for New Zealand Jurisprudence, The University of Waikato <http://www. 
waikato.ac.nz/law/research/cnzj/> at 30 September 2008; The Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence 
<http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/jurisprudence/> at 30 September 2008; Justice Policy Research Centre 
<http://www.newcastle.edu.au/school/law/jprc.html> at 30 September 2008; International Socio-Legal 
Studies Association <http://www.kent.ac.uk/nslsa/> at 30 September 2008; US Law and Society 
Association <http://www.lawandsociety.org/> at 30 September 2008; and Canadian Law and Society 
Association <http://www.acds-clsa.org/en/ at 30 September 2008>. 
80 L. Epstein, “The Rules of Inference” (2002) 69(1) University of Chicago Law Review 1. 
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use of case studies, and citation analysis are all helpful in arming lawyers with more 
extensive information on what is going on in court cases. 81 
 
Internationalisation and the advent of transnational legal contexts (especially in the 
number of international students entering the Australian law faculties) has popularised 
the comparative law methodology. Citation analysis is being used to measure how many 
times a particular researcher is cited, and which journals tend to be most influential 
judged by the number of times articles published in the journals are cited, and to evaluate 
‘the influence of other disciplines (such as economics) on legal scholarship, the sources 
which influence judges when they draft judgments and the influence of particular articles, 
scholars and legal journals’.82 Much of the empirical work has involved the ‘systematic 
and quantitative analysis of judicial decision making’.83 This has taken the form of 
analyses of High Court judgments examining variously the incident of dissent,84 the use 
of American precedent,85 the use of social fact evidence86 and the use of published 
journal articles.87 These are all examples of research that has moved beyond a basic 
                                                 
81 Refer in particular to C. Althaus, P. Bridgman & G. Davis, The Australian Policy Handbook (2nd ed, St 
Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 2007).  
82 I. Ramsay & G. P. Stapledon, “A Citation Analysis of Australian Law Journals” (1997) 21 Melbourne 
University Law Review 677; D. Warren, “Australian Law Journals: An Analysis of Citation Patterns” 
(1996) Dec Australian Academic and Research Libraries 261; I. Ramsay & G. Stapledon, “The Influence 
of Commercial Law Journals: Citation Analysis” (1998) 26 Australian Business Law Review 298. 
83 R. De Mulder & K. Van Noortwijk, “More Science than Art: Law in the 21st Century” (12th BILETA 
Conference The Future of Legal Education and Practice March 24th & 25th, 1997 Collingwood College, 
University of Durham <http://www.bileta.ac.uk/97papers/97-7.html> at 30 September 2008). 
84 A. Lynch, “Dissent: Towards a Methodology for Measuring Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of 
Australia” (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 470; see also the literature review, supra n. 5. 
85 P. Von Nessen, “The Use of American Precedents by the High Court of Australia, 1901–1987” (1992) 14 
Adelaide Law Review 181; P. Von Nessen, The use of comparative law in Australia (Rozelle: NSW: 
Lawbook, 2006); P. Keyzer, “The Americanness of the Australian Constitution: The Influence of American 
Constitutional Jurisprudence on Australian Constitutional Jurisprudence: 1988 to 1994” (2000) 19 
Australasian Journal of American Studies 25. 
86 R. Haigh, “‘It is Trite and Ancient Law:’ The High Court and the Use of the Obvious” (2000) 28 Federal 
Law Review 87. 
87 R. Smyth, “Academic writing and the courts: A Quantitative Study of the Influence of Legal and non-
Legal Periodicals in the High Court” (1999) 17(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 164; R. Smyth, 
“What do Intermediate Appellate Courts Cite? A Quantitative Study of the Citation Practice of Australian 
State Supreme Courts” (1999) 21 Adelaide Law Review 51; R. Smyth, “What do Judges Cite? An Empirical 
Study of the ‘Authority of Authority’ in the Supreme Court of Victoria” (1999) 25(1) Monash University 
Law Review 29; R. Smyth, “Other than ‘Accepted Sources of Law’?: A Quantitative Study of Secondary 
Source Citations in the High Court” (1999) 22(1) UNSW Law Journal 19. Smyth counted all citations to 
legal and non-legal periodicals in the sample cases and was thus able to identify five of the most-cited 
journals. This was followed by a more general study on the state Supreme Courts’ citing practices, covering 
both caselaw and secondary authority, and further studies on the High Court. 
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doctrinal approach to the law. 
 
Content analysis has been used to reveal the role of empirical facts in judicial 
reasoning.88 Cases are read and particular features (for example categories of comment) 
are coded. The process involves a method of ensuring reliability and validity in the 
coding be established, before the data is analysed.89 Hall and Wright, proponents of the 
method, contend that ‘content analysis makes legal scholarship more consistent with the 
basic epistemological underpinnings of other social science research. The method 
combines a disciplined focus on legal subject matter with an assumption that other 
researchers should be able to replicate the results of the research. Put another way, the 
results of the research matter more than the authority of the researcher.’90  
Content analysis is used to evaluate ‘the influence of other disciplines (such as 
economics) on legal scholarship, the sources which influence judges when they draft 
judgments and the influence of particular articles, scholars and legal journals’.91 Content 
analysis is a rapidly developing methodology in the United States to study the content of 
judicial decisions.92 However, the methodology has been rarely utilised in Australia.93 
This discovery of the impact and use of empirical data in the courts is further evidence of 
the need to educate future lawyers (and academics) in broader research methodologies.  
 
D Advantages and Disadvantages of using Non-doctrinal Research Methods 
 
Speaking in the 1970s, William Twining pointed out that the central weakness of the 
expository tradition, ‘is that typically it takes as its starting point and its main focus of 
attention rules of law, without systematic or regular reference to the context of problems 
they are supposed to resolve, the purposes they were intended to serve or the effects they 
                                                 
88  M. A Hall and R.F. Wright, supra n. 37; Burns (2004), supra n. 1; Mullane, supra n. 1. 
89 Hall, ibid. 
90 Ibid 2. 
91 I. Ramsay & G. Stapledon, “A Citation Analysis of Australian Law Journals” (1997) 21 Melbourne 
University Law Review 677. 
92 Hall, supra n. 37. 
93 Mullane, supra n 1; K. Burns, “The High Court and Social Facts” in Bryan (ed) Private Law in Theory 
and Practice (Routledge, Cavendish, 2007); Burns (2004), supra n. 1, 215. See also Selway supra n. 35. 
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in fact have.’94 When we look at the law more widely and when we look at how the law 
actually works, it is obvious that law teachers need to revise and widen their views on 
what they are teaching their students in terms of research methods. Training in traditional 
doctrinal analysis methodologies does not equip students to deal well with empirical 
facts. In 1992, Twining noted that the ‘use of statistical arguments in court and in other 
contexts is developing fast in the United States and is likely to spread to other parts of the 
common law world well before the year 2000’.95 He termed this the ‘new evidence 
scholarship’.96 Twining also made the point that ‘in my experience most lawyers are 
innumerate and most law students are terrified of figures’.97 He noted that Oliver Wendell 
Holmes had argued a century ago that lawyers need to master economics and statistics.98 
However, his predictions that ‘Holmes’ dictum will be incorporated in standard 
conceptions of competence by the year 2000’ has not eventuated.99  It is worthwhile 
noting too that Twining thought it ‘extremely unlikely’ that competence in empirical 
research could be developed by ‘quick fixes of CLE’.100 
 
Empirical research enhances lawyers’ ability to understand the implications and effects of 
the law on society.  Legal researchers can use social science methodologies themselves to 
investigate issues, or they can collaborate with skilled researchers from other disciplines. 
They are able to use statistics freely available and gathered by governmental 
organisations to enhance their views on the law’s operational aspects.101 This strategy has 
very definite advantages for unskilled lawyers as it saves time and ensures accuracy and 
public verification of the data has already occurred.  
 
                                                 
94 W. Twining, Taylor Lectures 1975 Academic Law and Legal Development (Lagos: University of Lagos 
Faculty of Law, 1976), 20. 
95 W. Twining, “Preparing Lawyers for the 21st Century” (1992) 3 Legal Education Review 1, 13-14.  
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid 14. 
98 Ibid; see also O. W. Holmes, “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457. 
99 Twining, Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 See for example the Australian Social Science Data Archive <http://assda.anu.edu.au/catalog.html> at 
30 September 2008. 
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It is easy to speculate on the reasons for reluctance to move beyond the familiar doctrinal 
methods. 102  Legal researchers still need to know how to integrate the information 
effectively. There are often constraints in that the data collected may be too general and 
not necessarily that required to critique a legal or social issue effectively. Often lawyers 
do not have the skills to use publicly available data sets effectively. There is a lack of 
training in the undergraduate degree for non-doctrinal methods of research.  Lawyers 
perceive they have insufficient expertise in order to judge empirical studies. It requires 
more time to undertake empirical work than doctrinal work. It costs more. Twenty years 
ago, Keith Hawkins and Donald Harris discussed the various models of funding of socio-
legal research and noted the constraints placed on research by the inherent need for 
customers willing to fund studies.103 The situation remains very much the same.  
 
Empirical research is more inconvenient. The results are often uncertain and certainly not 
predetermined. Elementary errors can be fatal to the outcomes. Even a simple survey 
entails precision in sampling, wording of the questions, coding of the questionnaire for 
easy entry of returned data, conduct of speedy ethical consent processes, provision for 
privacy with returned forms and follow-up communication with those being surveyed. In 
addition, there is often a requirement to work as part of a group – and often an 
interdisciplinary team. This requires extra time and commitment. And once the research 
is completed and the reports written, there can be uncertainty in regard to where to 
publish – whether in a legal journal or an interdisciplinary one. The method and citation 
style for writing up the research will be different for each. The level and depth of analysis 
will be different. In all, therefore, using non-doctrinal methodologies equates to less 
control over the process and outcomes than doctrinal work.  
 
III IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL RESEARCH TRAINING 
 
                                                 
102 T.Hutchinson, supra n. 18, 89-91. 
103 K. Hawkins & D. Harris, “Policy, Research, and Funding: Socio-Legal Studies in a Changed Political 
Climate” (1988) 10 (2&3) Law & Policy 267, 268. 
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It is now more than ever important to acknowledge that empirical research methodologies 
are relevant to the practice and research of law in the 21st century. As Jeremy Webber 
commented in 2004,104 
 
‘Legal sociologists should seek ways of incorporating practitioners’ deliberation 
into their analyses … And those making legal arguments — professionals, judges 
and academics alike — should similarly reflect on how the two modes of 
explanation intersect. This may mean exploring how sociological studies might 
contribute to the construction of legal argument. 
 … the law schools’ role extends to the systematic investigation of law’s effects, 
consideration of law’s function in society, and reflection on law’s nature and 
foundational principles. Those are essential tasks of law schools.  
…  And the more we know about the empirical effectiveness of the law, the better 
our students will be able to advise their clients on courses of conduct that are 
reasonable, not chimerical.’ 
 
Research training must include a broader non-doctrinal methodology component. There 
is a wealth of general social data that is used to some extent by the legislature but that 
also impinges on legal decision-making. There is a need to introduce students to the 
existence and nature of interdisciplinary research – the extensive work of anthropologists, 
sociologists, criminologists, economists and sociologists that impinge on the law. Law 
schools need to introduce a wider range of research methodologies into their research 
training particularly those based in the social sciences. Students must be aware of the 
basic principles of social investigation, where to source publicly available information, 
and how to critique empirical research from the perspective of validity and reliability. 
They must be able to distinguish valid empirical research from anecdotal evidence. This 
means that empirical methodologies must be introduced into the law curriculum so that 
law students can deal with empirical facts in a knowledgeable fashion.  
 
In doing this, legal academics have a role in ensuring that students are aware that there 
are various components in the judicial reasoning process – including the evidence and 
legal principle, but also facts based in the judge’s views and information based in the 
social sciences. Legal reasoning is more than simply applying law to the adjudicative 
facts. Other facts form part of the context.  
                                                 




A What are the Existing Opportunities for Lawyers to be Trained in Empirical 
Methodologies 
A number of Australian law faculties conducted curriculum reviews during 2007 and 
2008, so there is constant flux in the degree offerings nationally. Legal education has 
embraced skills in the last decade under the rubric of graduate attributes.105 However, 
each Australian law school curriculum must include the subject areas identified by the 
Priestley Committee in 1992.106 There are strong views from many legal educators that 
the Priestley 11, which is skewed towards substantive rather than skills-based instruction, 
is ‘a significant constraint on re-formulating Australian legal education in ways that are 
modern and relevant’.107 However the answer to this issue is not simply to take 
substantive material out of the degree and replace it with additional methodologies 
training. This is more a matter of practical exposure and appropriate treatment of 
empirical methodologies and evidence within the degree. 
 
Educational theory suggests two approaches that are relevant to any attempt to enhance 
non-doctrinal research training. In the first place, legal educators are advocating 
Cognitive Apprenticeship as espoused in the 2007 US Carnegie Report as a better 
educational framework than the Socratic Method or ‘case-dialogue teaching’.108 The 
Cognitive Apprenticeship approach to teaching advocates embedding ‘learning in 
activity’ and making ‘deliberate use of the social and physical context’.109 Secondly, 
current educational theory suggests the embedding of generic skills (which includes 
research methods) into the law curricula as a better framework to simply adding elective 
                                                 
105 S. Christensen & S. Kift, “Graduate Attributes and Legal Skills: Integration or Disintegration?” (2000) 
11(2) Legal Education Review 207, 213; R. Johnstone & S. Vignaendra, Learning Outcomes and 
Curriculum Development in Law: A report commissioned by the Australian Universities Teaching 
Committee (AUTC) (2003); Australian Technology Network (ATN), Generic Capabilities of University 
Graduates (2000); National Centre for Vocational Education Research (NCVER), Generic Skills for the 
New Economy: Review of Research (2001). W. M. Sullivan, A. Colby, J. W. Wegner, L. Bond & L. S. 
Shulman, Educating Lawyers (2007) 76, 194-7; Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A 
Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, Report No 89 (1999), [2.21]. 
106 Consultative Committee of State and Territory Law Admitting Authorities (the ‘Priestley Committee’). 
107 S. Kift, Australian Academy of Law Launch Government House, Brisbane, 17 July 2007 <http://www. 
alrc.gov.au/aal/events/skift.pdf> at 30 September 2008. 
108 Sullivan, supra n. 105. 
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units at the end of the degree.110 Where could empirical research methods fit within the 
overall framework? What prior learning could be used as a basis for training? It would 
involve a whole of curriculum approach but especially centring skills training in the legal 
research units. 
 
At present there are a variety of opportunities for a law student to participate in empirical 
methodology training. This includes prior training whether at school or in a prior degree 
to law, combined degree offerings, electives offered within the law degree, components 
of core units, or the opportunity to participate in an elective from another discipline as 
part of the law degree. A 2002 survey of Australasian law schools regarding research 
skills training inquired whether social science or empirical methodologies were covered 
in the research units. Only five responses indicated that empirical research was included 
in the undergraduate degree units. Three respondents stated that there were separate 
elective units covering these issues, and another two responses indicated that the material 
was covered in the postgraduate research units being offered.111  
 
In a March 2008 survey of the curriculum from 29 law schools websites in Australia, it 
was evident that very few courses explicitly included empirical training in their law 
degrees. Those that did exist could be placed in three categories – Law and Psychology 









































                                                                                                                                                 
109 J. S. Brown, A. Collins & P. Duguid, “Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning” (1989) 32 
Educational Researcher 32. 
110 M. Keyes & R. Johnstone, “Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality, and Prospects for the Future” 
(2004 ) 26 Sydney Law Review  537, 559. 
111 T. Hutchinson, “Where to Now? The 2002 Australasian Research Skills Training Survey” (2004) 14(2) 







































































































































































In the UK, Caroline Hunter at York Law School and UKCLE are currently carrying out 
similar research into the use of empirical research in the undergraduate law curriculum.  
This project is being funded by the Nuffield Foundation, and is seeking data on: 
‘i. Whether undergraduates are being taught skills that would enable them to either carry 
out or critique empirical work 
ii. Whether they are actually carrying out empirical projects of their own 
iii. Whether empirical work figures in other ways in teaching and assessment.’112 
 
There need to be more opportunities offered within the Law degree for these skills to be 
introduced. However, in terms of the overall law curriculum, research training units are 
now competing for space with other skills training as well as traditional substantive law 
content. Additional compulsory methodologies modules are therefore unlikely to find 
favour with administrators. At the very least, existing research modules may need to be 





                                                 
112 Empirical Research in the Undergraduate Curriculum 
http://www.york.ac.uk/law/LERSNet/empirical_research.htm 
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B  What are the curriculum implications arising from these examples of the uses being 
made of empirical facts? 
 
Legal research skills have consistently been regarded as basic requisites for both 
academic and practising lawyers, and have invariably been included in any listing of 
desired lawyer attributes.113 Certainly the Pearce Report in 1987 in Australia recognised 
the need for research training in a law degree.114 Legal research was one of ten 
fundamental lawyering skills identified in the 1992 MacCrate Report in the United 
States.115 The Australian Technology Network project 116 had also identified graduate 
attributes and generic capabilities for university graduates.117  
 
Recently, the Centre for Learning and Professional Development at Adelaide University 
has developed a cross-discipline Research Skills Framework.118 More focused legal 
                                                 
113 It is worthwhile to this discussion to be aware of the main literature in regard to the teaching of the units. 
For a ‘potted’ history pre-1993, see generally T. Hutchinson, “Legal Research in Law Firms,” in William S. 
Hein & Co (eds) Legal Research Guides, (Chapter 3, Volume 19, 1994); MSJ Keys Young, Legal Research 
and Information Needs of Legal Practitioners: Discussion Paper (Sydney: Law Foundation of NSW, 
1992); A. Sherr, Solicitors and their Skills: A Study of the Viability of Different Research Methods for 
Collating and Categorising the Skills Solicitors Utilise in their Professional Work (London, The Law 
Society, 1991); K. Economides & J. Smallcombe, Preparatory Skills Training for Trainee Solicitors 
(London, The Law Society, 1991); C. Roper, Senior Solicitors and their reasons for Participation in 
Continuing Legal Education (Centre for legal Education, 1993); D. Benthall-Nietzel, “An Empirical 
Investigation of the Relationship between Lawyering Skills and Legal Education” (1975) 63 Kentucky Law 
Journal 373; R. Schwartz, “The Relative Importance of Skills used by Attorneys” (1973) 3 Golden Gate 
Law Review 321; G. Nash, “How Best to Refresh Our Legal Knowledge” in Commonwealth Law 
Conference Proceedings and Papers (Hong Kong, 1983); J. de Groot, Producing a competent Lawyer: 
Alternatives Available (Centre for legal Education, 1995); J. Smillie, ‘Results of a Survey of Otago Law 
Graduates 1971-1981 (1983) 5(3) Otago Law Review  442, 450;  F. Zeman, & V. Rosenblum, “Preparation 
for the Practice of Law – the Views of the Practicing Bar” (1980) 1 American Bar Foundation Research 
Journal 1, 3; L. Baird, “A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training to Law School Graduates” (1978) 29 
Journal of Legal Education 264, 273; The Committee on the Future of the Legal Profession (‘The Marre 
Committee’), A Time for change: Report of the Committee (London, The General Council of the Bar and 
the Law Society’s Hall, 1998), 113; J. Peden, “Professional Legal Education and Skills Training for 
Australian Lawyers” (1972) 46 Australian Law Journal 157, 167. 
114 D. Pearce, E. Campbell & D. Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, A Summary (1987), 116-17, 132-5, 821-3. 
115 American Bar Association, Legal Education and Professional Development – An Educational 
Continuum (1992) (MacCrate Report). 
116 Bowden J. Bowden, G. Hart, B. King, K. Trigwell, & O. Watts, Generic Capabilities of ATN University 
Graduates, DETYA (2000) <http://www.clt.uts.edu.au/ATN.grad.cap.project.index.html> at 17 June 2006. 
117 S. Christensen & N. Cuffe, Graduate Capabilities in Law: QUT Teaching and Learning Development 
Large Grant Project Report (QUT Faculty of Law, January 2003), 11; see also Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, Report No 89, 1999. 
118 University of Adelaide, Research Skill Development <http://www.adelaide.edu.au/clpd/rsd/> at 30 
September 2008. 
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research skills frameworks have also been explored.119 Using these outlines, how could 
training in empirical research skills be introduced incrementally into current law 
curriculum designs? The most efficient method would seem to be to expose students to 
the methodologies within compulsory undergraduate units, include further basic training 
within compulsory research units, and in addition to provide elective units for those 
seeking to augment the initial training. There would be a strong case for arguing that this 
additional optional training should be a cross disciplinary unit such as those offered in the 
Justice Studies (Police training and Criminology) areas.  
 
At a very preliminary level, the challenge is to highlight empirical fact assumptions in 
first year course teaching. This can be achieved through the discussion of simple student 
surveys, and the thoughtful use of statistics and relevant empirical material in course 
content. Interdisciplinarity can be introduced through a discussion of policy 
considerations in tort law presentations120 or empirical evidence highlighted in criminal 
law contexts. Critique is an important skill. Law students above all need to be able to 
critique arguments that include empirical research effectively. How do you determine 
what is ‘good’ research? Specific criteria are available to judge the worth of empirical 
research and law students need to be introduced not only to the methodologies and how 
to carry out such research. Lawyers need to be able to critique research that others have 
carried out in order to judge the reliability of empirical data whether it is discussed as 
evidence – or reported in the newspapers as fact. 
 
Supervisors and legal academics can model the use of empirical methodologies for 
students.121 There are any numbers of ways this can be done. Substantive areas of the law 
can include an introduction placing the area in context. This can be accomplished through 
                                                 
119 N. Cuffe, Legal Information Literacy – student experiences and the implications for legal education 
curriculum development (Master of Information Technology (Research) Thesis, Queensland University of 
Technology, 2003). 
120 See the discussion of this form of assessment in M. Keyes & K. Burns, “Group Learning in Law” (2008) 
17(1) Griffith Law Review 357. 
121 For example this is done by Associate Professor Mike Robertson in his course at the Griffith Law 
School: Lawyers, Client and Legal Services <http://www.griffith.edu.au/courseoutlines/OLD/law/2008 
/s3/5123LAW_3080_CO.pdf> at 30 September 2008. Semi-structured interviews with lawyers are 
modelled for students. Students are required to collect and analyse data from these modelled interviews, 
and must also conduct and analyse their own interviews with lawyers. This work is assessable.  
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the use of relevant statistics, for example on the numbers charged with drink driving in 
the jurisdiction or the numbers charged with dangerous driving. Students might be 
encouraged to undertake short informal surveys for group exercises, undertake interviews 
or access interdisciplinary material as part of the criteria of their assessment.122 Social 
science evidence can be highlighted within substantive areas as being used in evidence 
for example in criminal law. Enhanced treatment in Evidence Law units is also 
warranted. 
 
There is more opportunity for students to achieve a depth of knowledge within the later 
year Honours units, undergraduate elective offerings and in the Masters, SJD and PhD 
research training units if the students come to higher studies armed with a basic 
understanding from their undergraduate courses. A postgraduate group of students may 
include some of the following: 
 
 International students trained overseas, often in civil law jurisdictions with 
varying degrees of English language expertise, 
 Postgraduate practitioners who may have been trained in the old Solicitors Board 
Examination era and who have little or no university experience, 
 Graduates who do not have an undergraduate law qualification, but are qualified 
in other areas such as engineering, town planning or business, 
 Practitioners who have been in private practice for up to 30 years but who have no 
computer skills, 
 Academics who are endeavouring to polish their research and academic writing 
skills, and 
 PhD and Professional Doctorate students (SJD). 
 
Postgraduate students need exposure to the range of research methodologies possible for 
their projects. This requires an introduction to methodologies to augment the doctrinal 
                                                 
122 This is required as part of a final year Interdisciplinary Research Project for students who are honours 
eligible at the Griffith Law School. See 5000LAW Interdisciplinary Research Project <http://www.griffith. 
edu.au/courseoutlines/OLD/law/2008/s1/5000LAW_3081_CO.pdf> at 30 September 2008. 
 
 28
work with which they are familiar. Some students might embark on extensive empirical 
methodologies. Others may consider a simple survey. Postgraduates therefore also need 
information on the process of requesting ethics approval from the relevant university 
committees.123  
 
To effectively introduce empirical facts recognition and awareness the material has to be 
introduced as part of assessment in units. This is more difficult to accomplish. One reason 
is that even for those units where students are at liberty to choose their own topics and 
their own research methods, there are time limitations involved. In Australian 
universities, there are often only 13 weeks in a semester. Even providing the students 
have their topic clearly defined at the beginning of the semester, there is still a lagtime 
required for the ethics approval procedure and a simple survey can take time to set up. 
For this reason students may be dissuaded from doing more than a doctrinal study within 
the timeframe. Only those who are engaged in longer projects can organise their work 
sufficiently to undertake a more extensive research program. Even then, they may 
encounter difficulties finding a suitable supervisor within the law faculty. Small numbers 
of postgraduate law students are taking up the challenge of empirical non-doctrinal 
studies because of the obstacles being encountered. Where then will future researchers 
gain the training required to apply for large research grants and undertake meaningful 
research? 
 
Central to this discussion is the cost of teaching research to large student bodies. In the 
current context in Australia, the overall numbers of students entering law schools have 
increased dramatically. Legal research requires academics with specific expertise. It is 
time consuming to teach. The levels of marking tend to be higher than a normal 
substantive unit. In this context, it would seem that the ability to include additional non-
doctrinal research training is less likely without a positive recognition of need. 
 
However, given a commitment by the universities and government to the need for 
change, advances are possible. The UK Nuffield Report recommended a system of 
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bursaries, grants and fellowships to encourage academic training in empirical research 
skills from undergraduate to post-doctoral level.124 These included academics being 
awarded bursaries ‘for the preparation of course materials and modules that would 
support undergraduate, post-graduate and mid-career training in empirical legal research 
skills’.125  There were also recommendations that the universities and law schools ‘should 
consider enhancing the undergraduate curriculum by offering an option on law in society, 
or offering options with a significant empirical content’ (for example family law, dispute 
resolution, some aspects of public law).126 Michael Adler in his 2007 report for the 
University of Edinburgh, noted that in the UK ‘For a very long time, the Nuffield 
Foundation and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) have been concerned 
with the lack of capacity to undertake rigorous empirical research on the law. As long ago 
as 1971, the Nuffield Foundation set up its own Legal Advice Research Unit and 
launched a scheme of Social Science Fellowships for Law Teachers. One year later, in an 
attempt to give an institutional impetus to socio-legal studies, the Social Science 
Research Council (the predecessor of the ESRC) established the Oxford Centre for Socio-
Legal Studies’.127 However as with the Nuffield Inquiry’s Final Report, Adler concludes 
that the problem is ‘a structural one which reflects the relatively weak position of socio-
legal researchers and, in particular of those who conduct empirical research in law 
schools, and the absence of any real incentives that would encourage law schools to take 
postgraduate training in socio-legal studies seriously.128 The situation in Australian law 
schools is by and large similar.  
 
IV IN CONCLUSION 
 
This article argues that empirical facts are an established part of the judicial reasoning 
process. However, lawyers have not been trained sufficiently well to deal with this 
information or to use it effectively. In addition, the evidential rules and legal process are 
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128 Ibid 2. 
 30
not sufficiently open to the effective use of this data in the courts. It is time that we as 
lawyers recognise all the aspects of the process necessary to deal with the modern factual 
context. Having done so, this will have quite far-ranging effects on the way law and 
indeed legal reasoning is taught. 
 
Traditional doctrinal models of legal research need to be supplemented by methodologies 
based on an awareness of the methods used in other disciplines particularly social 
research methods. This is already happening to some extent, especially within research 
work being carried out by law academics as part of competitive research grants, as part of 
interdisciplinary research teams, and by higher degree research students particularly PhD 
students. However, we need to begin training students from the undergraduate level 
effectively in the critical use of these methods. 
 
New models of legal education and law curricula need to incorporate empirical material 
and empirical methodologies. New curriculums being developed in the law schools need 
to recognise the changes occurring within society and research based social data being 
made available. This means that we should have not only basic empirical training 
incorporated within the various research skills units in the degree, more extensive 
elective offerings available, empirical experts available as supervisors and advisors for 
higher degree research students, but a recognition of the importance of empirical facts in 
legal reasoning within the substantive courses. This latter aspect is less achievable in 
some ways than the former because of the limited expertise demonstrated by substantive 
lawyers in recognising the importance of the use of this information in legal reasoning 
and even within the judicial process itself. However, small steps can be taken when there 
is some commitment. 
 
Law is not a closed system. It is intrinsically embedded in its specific legal context and 
community. The availability of empirical facts and the implicit use of this data is an 
indicator that we as lawyers need to change. Legal education naturally follows practice. 
Despite what is said about the law being a closed system, the examples of the use of 
empirical facts in this article demonstrate that law is being pressured to recognise the 
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existence of the work of other disciplines and its relevance to decision making in the 
courts, and therefore legal educators need to better equip the profession to deal with the 
contextual research that they encounter. 
 
Empirical methodologies give lawyers an opportunity to use forward planning by being 
cognizant of the context for change and the possibilities for constant evaluation of the 
way law is working in society in order to improve its effectiveness. At this point we need 
to better inform our profession – our judges, our law students, and academics on the 
wealth of data available to them and to encourage and to make provision for the 
proficient use of this data in the legal process. 
 
 
 
 
